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CONSIDERING THE COSTS: ADOPTING A JUDICIAL TEST FOR THE LEAST 
RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT MANDATE OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES 
EDUCATION ACT 
 
Edmund J. Rooney† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)1 was implemented in 
1990 as an update to the 1975 Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(“EHA”).2  Both laws were passed in order to aid state and local governments in 
providing educational services to children with disabilities.  They represent the 
cornerstone of federal legislation in the area of special education and are important 
markers in the development of special education programs in the United States that 
began in the second half of the twentieth century.3  
IDEA, building on the core of EHA, includes a set of six elements to develop 
and guide effective special education programs.  The first element is the use of 
individualized education programs (“IEP”) for students with disabilities and special 
educational needs.  The second element is that all students be provided with a free 
appropriate public education (“FAPE”).  The third is that students be placed in the 
least restrictive environment (“LRE”) for learning.  The fourth is that appropriate 
evaluations are used to assess student needs and progress.  The fifth is the requirement 
that teachers and parents participate in the planning and execution of a special 
education program.  The sixth, and final, element is a set of procedural safeguards 
and rights for parents during the special education process.4  
The law responds to the problem of segregation of students with disabilities that 
existed when the statute was passed.  This reality is reflected in the observations of 
Senator Robert Stafford who stated that the EHA “represents a gallant and 
determined effort to terminate the two-tiered invisibility once and for all with respect 
to exceptional children in the [n]ation’s school systems.”5  Thus, the concepts of 
                                                          
†J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2020; B.A. in History and Economics, University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, 2015.  I would like to thank the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation staff for all of their 
assistance in editing and revising this Note and my family members, especially my mother, grandmother, aunt, 
and cousin, who all work or worked in special education, for inspiring my interest in this specific topic of 
education law.  
1  Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (codified as 
amended at 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (2004)). 
2  Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773; OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. 
& REHAB. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HISTORY: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHIL-
DREN WITH DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA, (2000), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/leg/idea/history.pdf 
(discussing the history of special education legislation in the United States).  
3  See OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., supra note 2.  
4  Cynthia L. Kelly, Individuals with Disabilities Education Act – The Right ‘IDEA’ for All Childrens’ 
Education, 75 J. KAN. BUS. ASS’N. 24, 27 (2006).  
5  Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A Senator’s Perspective, 3 VT. L. REV. 71, 72 
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inclusion and mainstreaming have been prominent in special education law since the 
beginning.  The LRE mandate specifically responds to this spirit of inclusion and 
mainstreaming present in the statute.  However, the parameters of the mandate and 
inclusion are not entirely clear and throughout the life of EHA and IDEA there have 
been issues with the application of the LRE mandate, reflected in the significant 
amount of litigation regarding the mandate.6    
Despite school districts’ best efforts to accommodate diverse educational needs 
with limited resources, many parents still find their children’s learning environment 
to not be the “least restrictive” and resort to legal remedies.  Courts thus have a unique 
challenge in determining and applying a standard to assess learning environments.  
Accordingly, there is an important open question as to what the best judicial test is 
for evaluating the IDEA LRE mandate as well as what principles should guide 
Congress when updating the statute.  
In resolving that question, the interests of the key stakeholders in IDEA must be 
addressed.  The litigation relating to the LRE implicates several key stakeholders.  
The first and most obvious are children and, by extension, their parents.  As the focus 
of and primary participants in the educational system, children and their parents have 
a strong vested interest in an LRE standard that will maximize their educational 
potential.  Another key stakeholder is the school district.  As the purveyor of 
education and the designers of educational processes, school districts and their 
attendant boards, administrators, and staff have a vested interest in a standard that 
will allow them to execute their mission fully and efficiently.  School districts also 
have increasingly complex special education programs that take up a substantial 
amount of public education resources.7  Indeed, as an illustration of the significance 
of special education in a large American school district, the Chicago Public Schools 
budgeted $598,790,000 for “diverse learning” (the current district term for special 
education) from a total budget of $3.1 billion for the 2019 fiscal year.8  Finally, 
teachers unions and professional organizations that represent the educational 
employees who run special education programming and work directly with students 
and parents to achieve educational goals are key stakeholders.  The policy statements 
of the Chicago Teacher’s Union9 on special education as a local example and the 
National Education Association (“NEA”)10 as a national example demonstrate the 
degree of interest these professionals have in ensuring that a standard for the LRE 
mandate is feasible and helpful for the students.  
                                                          
(1978).  
6  See Brian L. Porto, Application of 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(a)(5), Least Restrictive Environment Provision 
of Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400 et seq., 189 A.L.R. FED. 297 (last 
updated Oct. 2018).   
7  See Maya Srikrishnan, Special Education Costs are Rising, NEW AM. WEEKLY (Feb. 8, 2018), 
https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-193/special-education-costs-are-rising/ (discussing a 50% in-
crease in special education costs over ten years in California public schools from 2005-2016). 
8  CPS Fiscal Year 2019 Budget, CHI. PUB. SCH. https://cps.edu/fy19budget/Pages/schoolsandnet-
works.aspx (last modified Aug. 9, 2018).  
9  See Special Education Task Force, CHI. TEACHERS UNION, https://www.ctunet.com/for-members/com-
mittees/special-education-task-force (last visited Oct. 21, 2018).   
10 See Our Position & Actions on IDEA /Special Education, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, 
http://www.nea.org/home/17673.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2019).   
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The outcome of the litigation in which these parties are involved is determined 
by the court that hears the case.  There is currently a circuit split in the federal court 
system among three primary tests that are used by federal courts to determine whether 
or not the LRE mandate has been met in a given case.11  The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Circuits apply a one-factor test where courts weigh the benefits of a segregated 
learning environment with the feasibility of providing the same services provided in 
the segregated environment in a regular educational setting.12  The Third, Fifth, and 
Tenth Circuits use a test introduced in the case of Daniel R.R. v. Board of 
Education.13  The test has two prongs, the first being an assessment of whether a 
school can use additional aids and services to create an appropriate public education 
in a regular classroom for a child with special educational needs.14  This prong 
involves the consideration of a variety of factors including the process utilized by the 
school district to create the educational environment and the educational benefit the 
plan provides for the child.15  The second prong applies when an educational benefit 
in the regular classroom is not possible and asks if the student has been mainstreamed 
to the extent possible.16  Finally, the Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits use a test that 
incorporates the Daniel R.R. test but adds an additional factor in the first step.17  This 
test also explicitly considers the costs to the school district of providing special 
education services in a given case.18 
It is also important to recognize that the LRE mandate is a mere portion of the 
complex IDEA regulatory scheme.  The legal issues and questions surrounding the 
LRE mandate are closely related and often intertwined with those of other provisions 
of the statute.  While the Supreme Court has not addressed a proper test or standard 
for assessing the LRE mandate, it has addressed another key area of IDEA.  In the 
recent 2017 case Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, the Court clarified 
the standard to be used when assessing another key provision: a free and appropriate 
public education.19  That standard and the language of the Court’s opinion in Endrew 
are helpful tools for assessing the effectiveness of LRE judicial tests.  It is also helpful 
for establishing the general expectations of the Supreme Court in educational cases.  
All of these factors demand a judicial standard that addresses the concerns of the 
stakeholders and the realities of the logistics and costs of modern education, while 
also reflecting Supreme Court precedent on IDEA.  This Note argues that such a 
standard exists in the Ninth Circuit’s existing LRE test.20  In Part I, this Note will 
explore the history of IDEA and identify the purposes behind the law.  Part II will 
                                                          
11  See generally Ian Farrell & Chelsea Marx, Fallacy of the Choice: The Destructive Effect of School 
Vouchers on Children with Disabilities, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1797, 1828-30 (2018).  
12  See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).  
13  Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).   
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id.   
17  Id. 
18  See Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); Sacramento City Unified Sch. 
Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Holland ex rel. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398 (9th Cir. 1994).  
19  Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017).  
20  See Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Holland ex rel. Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1400–
01..  
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review key litigation concerning IDEA, especially the Supreme Court’s Endrew 
decision, and identify the relevant stakeholders and their interests.  Part III will 
analyze the statutory text and regulations of the LRE mandate.  It will also examine 
the scholarly landscape of the LRE requirement and crystalize the interests of IDEA 
stakeholders as they pertain directly to the LRE mandate.  This Part will assess the 
Supreme Court’s approach to IDEA generally and specifically in the case of Endrew 
to establish guiding principles for analyzing LRE tests.  Using these assessments, 
Part III will present an evaluative framework to analyze judicial standards for the 
LRE mandate.  Part IV will provide a detailed introduction of the three primary LRE 
judicial tests used in the federal circuit split.  Part V will then analyze the tests using 
the evaluative framework from Part III to determine which one best meets the 
purposes of IDEA presented in the legislative history and case law, as well as the 
concerns of the key stakeholders.  Part VI will then examine the status of Congress 
reauthorizing IDEA and make a recommendation on appropriate Congressional 
action to help mitigate litigation regarding the statute.  
 
I. INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT  
 
This section will introduce IDEA and explore its history and purpose.  It will also 
identify the key elements of the statute.  In particular, the elements will be examined 
as to how they apply requirements to the school districts and grant rights to parents 
and children.  
 
A. HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE 
 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act was an update to the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act which was passed in the context of the federal 
government’s increasing involvement in regulating education during the second half 
of the twentieth century.  Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government began 
implementing laws to create and improve services for children with special 
educational needs.  This process began with the Training of Professional Personnel 
Act of 195921 which provided for the training of educators to specialize in working 
with children with special needs.  This progression included the Captioned Films Act 
of 195822 to provide films accessible to students with deafness and hearing 
difficulties as well as grants to states to fund the education of children with special 
needs.  The increasing level of federal involvement in special education culminated 
in the passage of EHA in 1975.23  EHA had four stated purposes and six substantive 
elements that are all central to IDEA and form the bedrock of federal special 
education law.  
The four purposes of EHA animate the federal special education statutory 
scheme and provide policy makers and courts with a sense of the mission of special 
education in the federal context.  The first purpose established in the law is “to assure 
                                                          
21  Training of Professional Personnel Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-158,73 Stat. 339.  
22  Captioned Films Acts of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-905,72 Stat. 1742.  
23  OFF. OF SPECIAL EDUC. & REHAB. SERVS., supra note 2 (stating the purposes outlined in the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-142). 
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that all children with disabilities have available to them … a free appropriate public 
education which emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet 
their unique needs.”24  The second purpose is “to assure that the rights of children 
with disabilities and their parents … are protected.”25  The third purpose is “to assist 
States and localities to provide for the education of all children with disabilities.”26  
Finally, the fourth purpose is “to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to 
educate all children with disabilities.”27 
These purposes illustrate the contours of special education law and policy in the 
United States.  Through the language Congress passed and President Ford signed, the 
federal government recognizes a right to a “free and appropriate public education” 
for children with disabilities.28  These purposes also show that the government has a 
clear interest in simultaneously protecting the aforementioned right and working with 
school districts to ensure that states, local governments, and school administrations 
have the resources necessary to provide appropriate special education services.  
Additionally, these purposes notably implicate all of the primary stakeholders—
parents and children, schools, and professionals—while also placing a special 
emphasis on evaluating the efficacy of special education programs for individual 
children.  
The purposes behind EHA remained significant when they guided a series of 
amendments to, and reauthorizations of, the law.  One such amendment in 1990 
changed its name to IDEA.29  IDEA made a few additions to EHA by adding 
provisions for helping to transition students with special educational needs from high 
school to adult life.30  Further amendments in 1997 strengthened the requirements for 
transition planning and the reporting requirements from the school to parents.31  Next, 
parts of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 200432 
aimed to reemphasize student outcomes over administrative procedures, in an attempt 
to match aims with the No Child Left Behind Act of 200133—which was the most 
significant piece of education legislation before this reauthorization.34  Each iteration 
of this area of law is plagued by a similar problem: proper funding for special 
education programs.  For a significant portion of the law’s history, federal 
appropriations failed to cover even 10% of the excess costs that resulted from the 
requirements and mandates of the law.35 
                                                          
24  Id. (quoting the four purposes of Pub. L. 94-142). 
25  Id.  
26  Id.  
27  Id.  
28  Id. (discussing the implications of Pub. L. 94-142). 
29  Id. (discussing 1990 reauthorization). 
30  Id.  
31  Id. (discussing 1997 amendments).  
32  Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108–446, 118 Stat. 2647 
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. 1400 et. seq. (2004)).  
33  No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.   
34  U.S. DEP’T EDUC., IDEA-REAUTHORIZED STATUTE – ALIGNMENT WITH THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND 
ACT, HTTPS://WWW2.ED.GOV/POLICY/SPECED/GUID/IDEA/TB-NCLB-ALIGN.PDF 
 (discussing aligning IDEA with the requirements of No Child Left Behind).  
35  Kelly, supra note 4, at 26.  
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This legislative and amendatory history demonstrates that IDEA evolved over 
the decades in an attempt to meet changes in a complicated educational environment.  
These changes have occurred while trying to satisfy the key stakeholders and their 
sometimes inherently contradictory interests.  It is clear that school districts will—in 
many cases—have cost concerns while working broadly on special education 
programming and budgeting.  Concerns about costs run opposite to parents and 
teachers, who would understandably hope that a student’s experience and growth 
potential is not limited by a federal, state, or local budget line item.  The fact that 
funding has been a recurring problem throughout the history of the law further 
highlights that costs are a central concern.  Given that this concern is so central, with 
a long history and direct connections to key stakeholders, funding should play a role 
in the identification of effective judicial standards for key provisions of the law.  
 
B. PRIMARY ELEMENTS/PRINCIPLES OF IDEA 
 
1. REQUIREMENTS OF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT 
 
Of the six primary elements of IDEA, the free appropriate public education 
requirement is at the heart of the law and provides the “what” in terms of what IDEA 
tries to accomplish.  FAPE establishes that special education is to be provided to 
students at no cost to the parents and sets a legal standard of “appropriateness” for 
the education provided to the student.36  The statute explicitly defines FAPE as being 
provided at public expense under state supervision, meeting the educational standards 
of the state involved, matching roughly the levels of traditional education, and 
matching the goals and requirements of the IEP prepared for the student.37  The FAPE 
element has been subject to much litigation as school districts and courts have 
struggled to parse out what constitutes a free and appropriate public education.  The 
two most prominent cases in this area will be explored later in this Note.38 
  An individualized education program is the tool through which a FAPE and 
special education is documented and ultimately administered: it provides the “how” 
of IDEA’s mission.  The statute defines it as a “written statement for each child with 
a disability that is developed, reviewed, and revised in accordance with section 
1414(d) of this title.”39  Section 1414(d) of IDEA lays out the substance and process 
requirements for the development of an IEP.  The substantive requirements state that 
IEPs must identify measurable goals and details of services being provided to the 
student and provide explanations of the degree to which a student will not be included 
in regular classroom activities.40  The process requirements state that IEPs be 
prepared annually by a team that includes special education professionals and the 
parents of the child.41 
                                                          
36  Id. at 27–28.  
37  20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2012) (defining “free appropriate public education” in the definitions section of 
the statute).  
38  Infra Part II. 
39  20 U.S.C. § 1401(14) (2012).  
40  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
41  20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B) (2012). 
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The least restrictive environment mandate is an additional key element of IDEA, 
providing the “where” or logistical realization of IDEA’s mission, which is also the 
focus of this Note.  The statute provides that in order to meet the LRE mandate, a 
school district must ensure that a child with a disability is educated with his or her 
peers to the “maximum extent appropriate” through the providing of supplemental 
services.42  This provision establishes a preference that children be “mainstreamed.”43  
As will be analyzed later in this Note, the parameters of this requirement has been 
subject to different legal tests and remains an open legal question nationally.44  
The last element that addresses the obligations of the school district under IDEA 
is the requirement that a proper evaluation be done for each child in order to 
determine appropriate services.45  The statute provides that a parent’s request or 
consent is generally required for initial evaluation.46  There are additional 
requirements that evaluators be trained in the area of special education services and 
that school districts use a “variety of assessment tools and strategies to gather relevant 
functional, developmental, and academic information, including information 
provided by the parent” to conduct the evaluation.47   
 
2. RIGHTS OF THE PARENTS AND CHILD 
 
The fifth key element of IDEA, and the first relating to the rights of parents and 
children, is the requirement that both teachers and parents participate in the planning 
and execution of a special education program.  This requirement is expansive and 
removes the unilateral decision-making power from the school that it may have in 
other areas.  Parents (and, when feasible, the students themselves) are to be included 
on the teams that prepare IEPs and determine placements for the student.  
Additionally, as mentioned above, parental request or consent is required to begin the 
process of evaluating a child for special education services unless the school district 
pursues a separate process.48  Parents also have responsibilities to communicate to 
the school district when they are considering removing a student49 or pursuing 
recourse against the school district.50  Overall, this element of IDEA with its various 
rights and responsibilities for parents demonstrates that IDEA is built around 
consensus decision-making.51  This notion of consensus is an important consideration 
when assessing legal tests as unlike many other statutory schemes, IDEA provides 
for the active participation of those affected in specific cases.  
Parents’ procedural safeguards are the final key element of IDEA.  This provision 
requires that parents be annually notified of their procedural rights under IDEA.52  
                                                          
42  20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5) (2012). 
43  Porto, supra note 6, at § 4.7.  
44  See infra Part IV (recognizing the most significant standards of a circuit split).  
45  20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
46  20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(1)(D) (2012). 
47  20 U.S.C. §1414(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
48  20 U.S.C. §1414(a)(1)(D). 
49  20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(iii) (2012).  
50  20 U.S.C. §1415(b)(7) (2012). 
51  Kelly, supra note 4, at 34.  
52  20 U.S.C §1415(d)(1)(A) (2012). 
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These rights include: the right to an alternative evaluation,53 access to educational 
records,54 the ability to present and work through due process complaints through 
hearings and mediation,55 and the right to bring civil action in court.56  These specific 
procedural rights reinforce the notion that IDEA is focused on a collaborative process 
and that parents and children have firm procedural and substantive rights related to 
the development and implementation of special education programs. 
This brief survey of the key elements and provisions of IDEA illustrate the 
statute’s many different parts and their different standards and requirements.  This 
mosaic of provisions does have some key unifying characteristics.  First, they are 
centered on a core goal of providing a child an opportunity to learn and develop in 
spite of a disability.  Second, IDEA implements a consensus driven process that 
requires regular interaction between the school district and parents in a decision-
making capacity.  Finally, it is important to recognize these elements are not 
necessarily clear and distinct—they interact to achieve IDEA’s goals.  Thus, 
litigation and commentary on one component of IDEA will have a great impact on 
the understanding of another. 
 
II. LITIGATION CONCERNING IDEA 
 
A. CASELAW 
 
A significant portion of the case law involving IDEA has unsurprisingly focused 
on the free appropriate public education requirement.  While not directly addressing 
the least restrictive environment mandate, these cases provide an important context 
for understanding the LRE cases.  In particular, they help identify what courts 
consider to be the key standards and tests to apply when there is litigation over special 
education programs.  This subsection will address two key Supreme Court cases that 
deal with the standard for assessing the FAPE requirement.  
 
1. ROWLEY (1982) 
 
The first case where the Supreme Court ruled on a provision of IDEA (then the 
EHA) was Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. 
Rowley in 1982.57  The issue in the case was the determination of what constitutes a 
FAPE.  The case involved Amy Rowley, a young student in New York with a hearing 
impairment.  Rowley’s IEP provided for the use of a hearing aide, with which she 
was able to perform well in her normal classroom setting.  However, Rowley’s 
parents believed that with an American Sign Language (ASL) interpreter, she would 
be able to perform much better.  They provided test results of her academic 
performance with and without an interpreter to demonstrate how much better she 
performed with an interpreter.  The Rowley family sued claiming that a FAPE for 
                                                          
53  20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(A) (2012). 
54  20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(D) (2012). 
55  20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(E) (2012). 
56  20 U.S.C. §1415(d)(2)(K) (2012). 
57  Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 306 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:13] 
their daughter would include the provision of an ASL interpreter.58  The district court 
and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals determined that without an interpreter, 
Rowley was not receiving a FAPE.  Specifically, the Second Circuit defined FAPE 
as “an opportunity to achieve [her] full potential commensurate with the opportunity 
provided to other children.”59 
Writing for a 6-3 majority, then-Justice William Rehnquist reversed the 
judgment of the lower courts.  The opinion laid out a different standard for 
determining a FAPE.  The opinion stated that FAPE means that a student gains and 
benefits from the services provided.  It rejected the idea that FAPE means the 
realization of full student potential.60  Applying that standard to the case, the Court 
determined that, since Rowley was advancing normally through her education, she 
was clearly receiving an educational benefit from her IEP.  Thus, under IDEA, the 
FAPE requirement had been met and the school district was not required to provide 
her with an ASL interpreter to meet its obligations under the Act.61   
This standard for FAPE and the Court’s opinion demonstrated two key points 
about the statute.  First, the focus of IDEA is on a benefit to the student, but not a 
maximization of a student’s learning experience.  Second, the opinion implicitly 
recognizes the burden placed on school districts by IDEA and explicitly releases them 
from having to provide every potential resource in order to fulfill the FAPE 
requirement.  
 
2. ENDREW (2017) 
 
The Rowley standard for FAPE persisted for three more decades.  However, it 
left open a question of degrees and how to distinguish the different types of benefits 
students could receive under a FAPE.62  The Supreme Court responded to this 
question in 2017 with the case Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District.  In 
Endrew, the petitioner was a student with autism whose parents placed him in a 
private school and applied for reimbursement per their rights under IDEA.  The 
parents argued that the school district had not provided a FAPE for their son and thus 
they were entitled to reimbursement under IDEA.  The school district argued that it 
had provided a FAPE and fulfilled its IDEA requirements.63  The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals ruled in favor of the school district, holding that so long as a “de minimis” 
benefit was provided by the IEP then the school district met the FAPE requirement 
and that the school district had done so in this instance.64  
Chief Justice John Roberts wrote a unanimous opinion for the Court.  The 
                                                          
58  Id. at 184–86 (1982).  
59  Id. at 185–86 (citing Rowley v. Bd. of Educ. Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., 483 F.Supp. 528, 534 
(1980)). 
60  Id. at 203–04.  
61  Id. at 209–10.  
62  This question was demonstrated by the dissent in Rowley itself.  See id. at 214 (White, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that the legislative history of IDEA establishes a FAPE standard of providing children with “an edu-
cation opportunity commensurate with that given other children.”).  
63  Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 996–97 (2017). 
64  Id. at 997–98.  
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opinion stated that the appropriate standard for assessing a FAPE is that the IEP is 
“reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the 
child's circumstances.”65  The Court made clear that this progress metric is fact 
intensive and is also a balance between the Tenth Circuit’s de minimis interpretation 
and the more expansive interpretation argued for by the parents.66   
The primary takeaway of Endrew is that the educational benefit necessary for a 
FAPE must include an element of progress.  This notion of educational progress is 
important to recognize for the other elements of IDEA, as the Supreme Court makes 
clear it is the test for one of the core aspects of the statute.  
The Supreme Court in both Rowley and Endrew demonstrated two key concerns 
for IDEA cases and general interpretation of the statute.  First, they made clear that 
the purpose of the statute is to promote educational benefits for students with 
disabilities and specifically benefits with an element of progress.  Second, the 
Supreme Court recognized that the requirements of IDEA do not amount to a 
guarantee of proficiency or growth.  Inherent in that recognition is a concern that 
school districts cannot provide every possible resource to students.  This concern 
implicitly acknowledges cost limitations—both financial and human—on what 
school districts can provide for students with disabilities.  So, the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on IDEA presents the dual, and sometimes conflicting, concerns of 
progress and cost to consider when resolving cases dealing with provisions of the 
statute.   
 
B. KEY STAKEHOLDERS IN IDEA LITIGATION 
 
For the purposes of analyzing judicial standards for provisions of IDEA, an 
important first step is to identify the key stakeholders in litigation regarding the 
provisions.  The FAPE cases are the primary Supreme Court precedents on IDEA 
and allow for a clear identification of the key stakeholders both at the national and 
local level.  The primary stakeholders whose interests are relevant to the analysis of 
a workable standard for the LRE mandate are, first and foremost, students and 
parents.  Secondly, school districts have a strong interest in a workable LRE standard.  
Finally, teachers and school professionals have a clear, vested interest in the 
standards applied to IDEA provisions and will be analyzed briefly here.  
 
1. STUDENTS AND PARENTS 
 
The first stakeholders in IDEA litigation are obviously the students with 
disabilities and their parents.  IDEA was devised as a legislative solution to 
discrimination against, and isolation of, students with disabilities.67  Accordingly, 
these students and their primary advocates—their parents—have strong interests in 
                                                          
65  Id. at 999. 
66  Id. at 1001 (holding that the standard the parents argue for, “an education that aims to provide a child 
with a disability opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and contribute to society 
that are substantially equal to the opportunities afforded children without disabilities,” is inconsistent with the 
holding of Rowley).  
67  Stafford, supra note 5, at 72.  
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legal standards.  A broad condition of IDEA is that, in order for a state to receive 
federal funding for special education programs, the state must establish a “goal of 
providing full educational opportunity to all children with disabilities.”68  This high 
goal guides the interests of the parents and students.  This is particularly illustrated 
in arguments of the parents in Endrew, where they called for the definition of FAPE 
to be “an education that seeks to provide children with disabilities with substantially 
equal opportunities to achieve academic success, attain self-sufficiency, and 
contribute to society.”69  This interest in broad educational opportunities for a child 
with disabilities is clear in this single case involving a student with autism.  However, 
it also belies the general overarching concern about such opportunities in a variety of 
contexts.  This is best represented by the briefs in Endrew supporting the arguments 
of the parents.  They make clear that judicial tests should comport with the purpose 
of IDEA and that demanding standards are called for by the statute.70  There is also 
a call for as much specificity as possible in the legal standard given the gravity of the 
decisions that must be made for students with disabilities.   Advocates for Children 
of New York and other organizations argued that specific standards are necessary for 
parents to plan and advocate for their children effectively.71  So, in sum, parents and 
students are key stakeholders and have a clear interest in specific standards when it 
comes to the provisions of IDEA.  
 
 
2. STATES AND THEIR SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
 
The Douglas County School District, as the respondent in Endrew, represented 
the parents’ natural opposition.  States and their respective school districts have a 
series of mandates they must meet in order to receive federal funding for their special 
education programs.  There is a natural assumption that since states and school 
districts provide education to thousands of students, they will be reticent about strict 
and demanding legal standards for the provisions of IDEA.  Indeed, the briefs in 
Endrew make clear that this is their key interest in the determination of IDEA 
standards.  The brief for the school district argued for the de minimis standard for 
FAPE and that IDEA’s text, purpose, and history supported this standard since 
Congress was not explicit in setting high standards.72  Additionally, amicus briefs for 
the school district argued that courts should stay out of the complex decision making 
of developing special education programs and allow greater deference to the states 
                                                          
68  See 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(2) (2012) (establishing the “full educational opportunity goal” of IDEA). 
69  Brief for Petitioner at 40, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 
(2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 6769009, at *40. 
70  See generally Brief for Nat’l Disability Rights Network, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2016) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 
6916164. 
71  Brief for Advocates for Children of N.Y., et. al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Endrew F. 
ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 6892531, at 
*23–24. 
72  Brief for Respondent, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 
(2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 7321785, at *37.  
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and school districts.73  Specifically, the organizations of school management 
professionals argued that Congress, and not the courts, is the best actor to define 
standards for IDEA since Congress authored it, and the statute exists in a greater 
context of federal education funding.74  Overall, school districts have a clear interest 
in IDEA standards that are limited, and give deference to the school district in how 
they make decisions and allocate resources.  
 
3. SPECIAL EDUCATION TEACHERS 
 
The final key stakeholder in IDEA litigation is separate from the immediately-
clear adversarial parties in IDEA litigation.  However, it is implicit given the structure 
of IDEA’s requirements that the teachers will form a separate stakeholder group.  
While their professional obligations will orient them to maximizing student 
outcomes, the realities of working in education will make teachers sensitive to the 
funding and human demands of applying the law.  The text of IDEA itself identifies 
teachers by establishing that IEP teams include teachers and specialists.75  IEP teams 
include a distinct class of special educational professionals who for all intents and 
purposes are responsible for executing the goals of not only IDEA but also the 
established state and local education policies and goals.  Since a significant portion 
of school districts have unionized teachers,76 there is a centralized space for these 
professionals to articulate their interests in IDEA litigation.  The NEA’s brief in 
Endrew made clear that teachers consider it their professional and moral duty to 
ensure students with disabilities have educational opportunities and that those 
opportunities exceed de minimis standard at issue in the case.77  Additionally, the 
NEA has identified a number of policy goals related to IDEA with a clear focus on 
the full funding of special education.78  Special education teachers, with their unique 
role in executing the provisions of IDEA, have stated concerns regarding ensuring 
student progress but also securing funding and recognizing the limitations of 
financial resources.  When compared to other stakeholders, this balanced approach 
has a moderating and pragmatic influence in discussions surrounding IDEA 
provisions. 
In combination, these three interests of key stakeholders provide three of the 
necessary prongs to evaluate IDEA mandates and specific LRE judicial standards.  
                                                          
73  See Brief of Amici Curiae Colo. State. Bd. of Educ. & Colo. Dep’t of Educ. Supporting Respondent, 
Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 
7450495 at *14 (arguing that IDEA is part of a greater educational funding statutory landscape and requires 
unambiguous standards and defers implementation to the States). 
74  Brief of AASA, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Douglas 
Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL 7450494, at *7–14. 
75  20 U.S.C. §1414(d)(1)(B) (2012) (statutory section identifying the requirements of an IEP team).  
76  Union Affiliation of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by Occupation and Industry, BUREAU LABOR 
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t03.htm (last modified Jan. 19, 2018) (table detailing the un-
ionization rates of various professions, “education, training, and library occupations” had a union representation 
rate of 38.2%).  
77  Brief Amicus Curiae of Nat’l Educ. Ass’n. Supporting Petitioner, Endrew F. ex rel. Joseph F. v. Doug-
las Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988 (2017) (No. 15-827), 2016 WL  6916168, at *3–4. 
78  NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 10 (background section discussing the NEA’s top priority related to 
IDEA being fully funded special education programs).   
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III. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ENVIRONMENT MANDATE TEXT AND 
EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
IDEA has multiple key provisions that are bound by the statute’s purpose of 
opening educational opportunities to students with disabilities.  With the FAPE at the 
core, the other key provisions fit together as a mosaic of statutory mandates.  Within 
this mosaic, the LRE mandate looms large.  As addressed in the introductory material 
of this Note, the LRE mandate answers the all-important “where” of a special 
educational program.  It is a logistical concept that involves spatial and staffing 
decision making and has a direct impact on a student’s educational opportunities.79  
The significance of LRE within the greater framework of IDEA calls for a workable 
judicial standard, as has been provided for the FAPE requirement. 
In order to evaluate and establish a workable standard for the LRE, a brief 
analysis of the statute itself and related case law is necessary.  From there, an analysis 
of the scholarship on the LRE mandate and an assessment of the interests of the key 
stakeholders in IDEA litigation can be utilized to build a framework for evaluation 
of judicial standards for LRE.  Additionally, because of the interconnectivity of IDEA 
provisions, and the fact that FAPE—but not LRE—has been directly litigated before 
the Supreme Court, the holding of Endrew can be used to help assess judicial 
standards as well.  Together, this analysis provides an evaluative framework for 
judicial standards for LRE.  
 
A. STATUTORY TEXT 
 
The section of IDEA that articulates the language behind the LRE mandate reads:    
 
(A) In general  
 
To the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities, 
including children in public or private institutions or other care 
facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and 
special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of 
children with disabilities from the regular educational 
environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the 
disability of a child is such that education in regular classes 
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be 
achieved satisfactorily. 
 
(B) Additional requirement 
 
(i) In general  
 
A State funding mechanism shall not result in placements 
that violate the requirements of subparagraph (A), and a 
State shall not use a funding mechanism by which the State 
                                                          
79  See supra Part I.B.1 (the six requirements of IDEA). 
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distributes funds on the basis of the type of setting in which 
a child is served that will result in the failure to provide a 
child with a disability a free appropriate public education 
according to the unique needs of the child as described in 
the child's IEP. 
 
(ii) Assurance  
 
If the State does not have policies and procedures to ensure 
compliance with clause (i), the State shall provide the 
Secretary an assurance that it will revise the funding 
mechanism as soon as feasible to ensure that such 
mechanism does not result in such placements.80 
 
This text establishes three core components of the LRE that are also spelled out 
in the federal regulations for IDEA.81  First, students with special educational needs 
are to be educated with their peers to the extent possible.82  The LRE mandate is 
generally read as requiring “mainstreaming” of students with special educational 
needs.83  Second, there is an acknowledgement by the use of the term “satisfactorily” 
that there is a line for when students mainstreaming can be set aside in favor of a 
segregated learning environment.84  Third, funding plans and limitations are 
specifically barred from creating a situation where a student is educated in an 
environment that does not meet the goals of mainstreaming.85  
The LRE has been addressed in a variety of litigation in federal district and 
circuit courts over the last four decades.  In these cases, the courts have broadly 
emphasized the need for mainstreaming students with disabilities while also 
recognizing IDEA requires individualized education plans and accommodations as 
manifested by the IEP requirement.86  School districts have had difficulty balancing 
mainstreaming and individualized education, and this is where litigation has often 
occurred.87  The point of diversion between the federal courts on the issue of 
assessing the LRE requirement is what factors to consider when evaluating specific 
cases.88  Thus, there is no national judicial standard for applying the LRE mandate 
due to a circuit split on what the most important factors are in considering whether 
or not a learning environment is in fact the  “least restrictive.”  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80  20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5) (2012).   
81  34 C.F.R. §300.114 (2006).  
82  20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(A) (2012). 
83  Stacey Gordon, Making Sense of the Inclusion Debate Under IDEA, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L. J. 189,  
198 (2006).  
84  §1412(a)(5)(A). 
85  20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(5)(B)(i) (2012).  
86  See infra Part IV (discussing and identifying key LRE case law). 
87  Porto, supra note 6, at §2[a].   
88  Farrell & Marx, supra note 11, at 1828–30.  
 312 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 45:13] 
B. CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP 
 
As with other aspects of IDEA, the LRE mandate is a common subject of legal 
scholarship by both law students and legal and educational academics.  Using the 
2004 reauthorization of IDEA as a starting point, there has been extensive scholarship 
addressing the fundamental ideas behind the LRE mandate and trying to develop a 
national LRE standard.  Shortly following the 2004 reauthorization, Ruth Colker 
argued against a rigid integration presumption.  Instead, she advocated for the 
inclusion of additional factors (which are open for debate) in determining 
placements.89  This article offered a challenge to the foundation of the 
mainstreaming/integration presumption and advocated for a more thoughtful analysis 
of what constitutes the “least restrictive environment.”  
Colker’s article prompted responses that favored maintaining the integration 
presumption.  Samuel Bagenstos argued that there is a risk in abandoning the 
integration presumption that children may be inappropriately driven back into 
segregated placements.90  Marc Weber’s response argued the integration presumption 
should be kept in place but applied in a nuanced manner.  Specifically, he 
recommended that when parents resist integrated settings, the presumption be given 
less strength, but when school districts resist integration, the presumption be applied 
strongly and the decisions of the school districts closely scrutinized.91  These two 
responses along with Colker’s article demonstrate the scholarly debate surrounding 
the integration presumption that continues decades after the passage of IDEA.  
Other authors have also argued for rethinking the integration presumption at the 
heart of the LRE mandate.  Taking a similar approach to Colker, Bonnie Spiro 
Schinagle and Marilyn J. Bartlett made the case that in the wake of the initial passage 
of IDEA, integration of students with special education needs into regular classrooms 
was a primary goal due to their prior isolation.92  However, the authors argued that 
in the decades since IDEA was passed, inclusion is no longer as critical a concern as 
society and educational opportunities and services have changed.  Rather, in their 
view, the LRE mandate should be applied in a “truly individualized” manner, with a 
rejection of an automatic presumption for mainstreaming.93  This argument goes to 
the heart of the LRE mandate and calls for a rethinking of its rationale and 
application.  
Similarly, Mark T. Keaney argued that teacher interests should be accounted for 
in a reconceptualization of the debate about integrating special and general education 
students.  The argument rests on the idea that teachers—when given adequate 
resources, options, and input on the feasibility of placements—will be able to 
                                                          
89  Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 789 
(2006).  
90  Samuel R. Bagenstos, Response, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not Yet, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 157 (2007), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol156/iss1/4/. 
91  Mark C. Weber, Response, A Nuanced Approach to the Disability Integration Presumption, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. ONLINE 174 (2007), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol156/iss1/6/.  
92  Bonnie Spiro Schinagle & Marilyn J. Bartlett, The Strained Dynamic of the Least Restrictive Environ-
ment Concept in the IDEA, 35 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. J. 229 (2015). 
93  Id. at 249.  
  
 Journal of Legislation 313 
implement plans to the benefit of all.94  This argument also calls for a reevaluation of 
the mainstreaming presumption and specifically calls for an expansion of the 
considerations included in applying the LRE mandate. 
Other scholarship has sought to evaluate the existing LRE judicial standards and 
determine which judicial standard best fulfills the purposes of IDEA.95  While the 
scholarship reaches different conclusions, it illustrates an academic desire to clarify 
the LRE mandate.  The scholarship also collectively seeks to establish real guidance 
for parents, children, teachers, and school districts as they navigate the IEP process.  
In sum, both the questioning of the foundations of the LRE mandate and the search 
for a workable judicial standard demonstrate that the LRE mandate is ripe for both 
judicial and legislative reevaluation.  
 
C. IDEA Stakeholder Interests in LRE Cases 
 
When assessing potential national judicial standards for the LRE requirement, it 
is important to include the interests of key stakeholders in the broader IDEA statute 
in any analysis used.  Given that LRE cases exist in the educational legal space, there 
is a defined pool of litigants and directly affected parties that should be examined.  
Falling into the broader category of IDEA litigation, the key parties that are typically 
involved in LRE cases are the same as those that are involved in the FAPE cases: 
parents and children, school districts, and special education professionals.  The 
central question for all of these parties is to what degree should a child with special 
educational needs be mainstreamed.  This Section briefly identifies party specific 
interests relating to the LRE mandate to build prongs of an evaluative framework for 
an LRE judicial standard.  
 
1. PARENTS AND CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL NEEDS 
 
Parents and their children who have special educational needs have a natural 
interest in an LRE standard that allows the child to be placed in a regular classroom 
and gives them educational and social growth opportunities available to other 
children.  However, in the complex world of special education, there is a recognition 
that the decision of what classroom to educate a child in requires more thought than 
merely pushing a student into a regular classroom.  Specifically, the Federation for 
Children with Special Needs (“FCSN”) advises parents to ensure that LRE decisions 
are made “individually and carefully.”96  The FCSN also addresses that an LRE is 
                                                          
94  Mark T. Keaney, Comment, Examining Teacher Attitudes Toward Integration: Important Considera-
tions for Legislatures, Courts, and Schools, 56 ST. LOUIS L.J. 827 (2012).  
95  See, e.g., Adam B. Diaz, Note, How the Mainstreaming Presumption Became the Inclusion Mandate, 
40 J. LEGIS. 220 (2013–14) (arguing for a test that uses the second prong of the Fifth Circuit Daniel R.R. test 
but using the factors developed in the Ninth Circuit Rachel H. case); Sarah Prager, Note, An "IDEA" to Con-
sider: Adopting a Uniform Test to Evaluate Compliance with the IDEA's Least Restrictive Environment Man-
date, 59 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 653 (2014) (advocating for the Fifth Circuit Daniel R.R. test); Megan McGovern, 
Note, Least Restrictive Environment: Fulfilling the Promises of IDEA, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 117 (2015) (argu-
ing for a test resembling the Fifth Circuit Daniel R.R. test). 
96  What is Available by Law, FED’N FOR CHILD. WITH SPECIAL NEEDS, https://fcsn.org/sepo/law/ (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2019). 
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based on the educational needs of a child, not the limitations or accommodations of 
his or her disability.97  This guidance to parents demonstrates a strong interest in 
mainstreaming that, while significant, is tempered by a desire for their children to be 
educated in an environment in which they can succeed educationally.  
A specific illustration of a potential reason parents may not want their children 
mainstreamed is the risk of bullying faced by children with disabilities.  In a 2018 
study, it was found that children with autism spectrum disorder (“ASD”) in regular 
classrooms were 6.5 times more likely to have been bullied than those in special 
placements.  This was in part due to social skill deficits and difficulties with 
emotional reactivity.98  While in many ways obvious, the interest of parents and 
children to have an educational setting that will promote growth is critical for the 
establishment of an effective LRE judicial standard.  In fact, given the purpose and 
history of the statute, the needs of the students to have an LRE established for their 
educational needs should be the primary factor in establishing a judicial standard.  
 
2. SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
 
School districts have a clear and strong interest in compliance with IDEA, and 
thus with ensuring students are placed in regular classrooms to the extent possible.  
The public statements and policies of school districts generally reflect this desire and 
aspiration for compliance.99 However, in the LRE space, school districts have an 
inherent issue of also recognizing the educational needs of other students.  The 
potential for classroom disruption when children with special education needs are 
placed in regular classrooms does exist.100  School districts also have an obligation 
to parents and children without special educational needs,101 which is generally 
recognized publicly with an inclusive, if generic, mission statement.102     
Thus, the interests of school districts include a consideration of the impact 
placements have on the general education classroom at large.  This should not be the 
primary consideration in evaluating LRE judicial standards because of school 
district’s desire to comply with IDEA.  However, in the broader scope of education, 
it is an important issue to be included as an additional concern so that implementation 
                                                          
97  Id. 
98  Benjamin Zablotsky, Bullying and Mainstreaming in the Schools, AUSTISM SPEAKS (Sept. 28, 2018), 
https://www.autismspeaks.org/blog/bullying-and-mainstreaming-schools.  
99  See Diverse Learners – Special Education Support Services, CHI. PUB. SCHS., https://cps.edu/diverse-
learners/Pages/ServicesandPrograms.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (“Special classes, separate schooling, or 
other placements that remove students from the regular education classroom occur only when specified by a 
student's Individualized Education Program (IEP).”).  
100  See Christina Samuels, Does Inclusion Slow Down General Education Classrooms?, EDUC. WEEK 
(Nov. 3, 2017), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/speced/2017/11/does_inclusion_slow_down_general_educa-
tion.html (discussing an international study that found teachers with no students with disabilities spent roughly 
12% more time teaching than those with a classroom including students with special educational needs).   
101 See generally Introduction – Our Mission, CHI. PUB. SCHS., https://cps.edu/About_CPS/vi-
sion/Pages/mission.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (stating the Chicago Public Schools system mission is to 
“To provide a high quality public education for every child, in every neighborhood, that prepares each for 
success in college, career and civic life.”). 
102  See Equity and Excellence, N.Y. DEP’T OF EDUC., https://www.schools.nyc.gov/about-us/vision-and-
mission/equity-and-excellence (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (“Every child deserves an excellent education”). 
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of LREs does not overwhelm general education classrooms. 
 
3. SPECIAL EDUCATIONAL PROFESSIONALS  
 
The final key stakeholders in LRE cases are special education professionals.  
Much like the school district’s legal obligation, these school employees have a 
professional obligation to ensure that students are placed in an educational 
environment where they can learn and grow.  However, as demonstrated by the 
statements of the NEA and similar organizations, the fact that IDEA mandates are 
not fully funded by the federal government greatly complicates the situation.103  
Additionally, there is the reality that in order for IDEA to be executed properly, there 
needs to be a trained educational workforce capable of implementing it.  A 2012 
study found that nearly a quarter of special education teachers in the rural U.S. left 
their positions due to issues related to stress and lack of support.104  The inherent 
stress of paperwork and coordinating with multiple professionals to plan and 
implement IEPs is compounded by a disconnect many special education 
professionals experience with regular educational teachers.105  The funding shortfalls, 
and difficulties facing special education teachers, warrant including the practical 
feasibility of a learning environment for a student with special educational needs 
when considering a workable LRE judicial standard.   
 
D. SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE FOR LRE 
 
An additional important factor for an LRE evaluative framework is the guidance 
of the Supreme Court.  While the Supreme Court has never ruled directly on an LRE 
standard, it has given guidance on other parts of IDEA.  IDEA is notable in the 
educational community for its multiple critical pieces and their complicated 
interactions.  The intricate interacting pieces of the statute106 can be likened to a 
mosaic, and given its challenges, a puzzle.107  Accordingly, when the Supreme Court 
gives guidance on one portion of the statute, this advice can reasonably be applied to 
the other pieces.  The purpose of IDEA, to provide educational access for children 
with special educational needs, is only feasible when the different provisions inform 
and strengthen each other.  The Supreme Court’s standard for the critical FAPE 
component in Endrew, that the student’s educational plan must include an element of 
progress, is applicable to the LRE requirement.  The judicial standard for LREs 
should include a consideration of whether the learning environment or the degree of 
mainstreaming is suited for a student’s educational progress.  Much like the Supreme 
Court’s analysis of the FAPE requirement, neither de minimis growth nor a static 
educational situation stemming from an LRE will meet the purposes of IDEA.  
                                                          
103  NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 10.  
104  Christina A. Samuels, Why Special Educators Really Leave the Classroom, EDUC. WEEK (Jan. 24, 
2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/01/24/why-special-educators-really-leave-the-class-
room.html.  
105  Id.  
106  See supra text accompanying note 4. 
107  See Allison Zimmer, Solving the IDEA Puzzle: Building a Better Social Education Development 
Process Through Endrew F., 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (Oct. 2018).  
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Further, such a situation ignores the explicit guidance of the Supreme Court on a 
closely related and essential provision of IDEA.  If the LRE is not appropriate for 
real educational progress, then the other provisions of IDEA will be complicated, and 
the child will likely fall short of educational goals.  
 
E. EVALUATIVE FRAMEWORK 
 
A consideration of the Act’s text, the interests of key stakeholders, and the 
guidance from the Supreme Court are all necessary for a workable LRE judicial 
standard.  Together they comprise a framework that can be used to evaluate existing 
LRE judicial tests for their viability as a national standard.  The framework is 
composed primarily of whether a standard is clearly oriented towards mainstreaming 
and ensuring a capacity for educational progress for the student with special 
educational needs.  This component addresses the mainstreaming language of IDEA 
itself, the progress-oriented guidance of the Supreme Court, and the interests of 
parents.  However, given the importance of other stakeholders in IDEA cases, the 
consideration of general feasibility (in terms of both finances and staffing resources) 
is included in the framework.  This consideration addresses the interests of school 
districts and special education professionals, who are essential to the successful 
implementation of IDEA.  So, in summary, a workable LRE judicial standard will 
include elements that are primarily oriented towards the concerns of student progress 
and mainstreaming, with a secondary concern of whether or not the LRE in the 
specific case is feasible logistically and financially.  
 
IV. CIRCUIT SPLIT: THE THREE LRE JUDICIAL STANDARDS 
 
There are three prominent LRE judicial standards worth examining using the 
evaluative framework constructed in Part III.  They are the tests utilized by the 
various federal circuit courts when confronted with cases alleging a school district’s 
failure to fulfill IDEA’s LRE mandate.  This Section will assess their cases of origin 
and identify the tests to be considered.  
 
A. RONCKER 
 
The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits use an LRE test rooted in the 1983 Sixth 
Circuit opinion Roncker v. Walter.108  In that case, Neill Roncker was a nine-year-
old boy from Ohio who had severe intellectual challenges.  In determining an 
appropriate placement for Roncker under IDEA, the school district made the 
determination to place him in a special county school.  The school exclusively served 
children with severe intellectual disabilities and challenges.  The result was that 
Roncker did not have any contact with non-challenged students.109  Roncker’s parents 
filed suit claiming that while their son required special educational instruction, it 
could be provided in a setting where he was in contact with children who did not have 
                                                          
108  See Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 96th Cir. 1983); N.W. ex rel. A.W. v. Nw. R-1 Sch. Dist., 813 
F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir. 1987); DeVries v. Fairfax Cty. Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 879 (4th Cir. 1989). 
109   Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060. 
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intellectual disabilities, and thus the school district failed to meet the statutory LRE 
mandate.  The district court found in favor of the school district, finding that IDEA 
(then the EHA) gave school districts broad discretion in determining placements for 
children with intellectual disabilities.  The district court cited Rockner’s lack of 
progress while temporarily in a school with children with and without intellectual 
disabilities as reason enough for the school district’s decision.110  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court’s deference to the school 
district was not the appropriate standard for assessing whether a school district has 
met the LRE mandate.  Rather, the court established a baseline of mainstreaming to 
the maximum extent appropriate, per Congressional preference.111  As a standard and 
test, the court directed lower courts to determine whether the attributes and services 
that make a segregated learning facility superior for a given child can feasibly be 
provided in a non-segregated setting.  If they can be, then the LRE mandate has not 
been met if the student is placed in the segregated facility.  The Sixth Circuit 
remanded the case for application of this standard.112  This amounts to a one factor 
test applicable when directly comparing a regular classroom placement with a 
segregated facility considered superior for that child’s needs, wherein the feasibility 
of providing the services of a segregated facility in a non-segregated one is the 
determinative factor.   
 
B.   DANIEL R.R. 
 
The Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits use an LRE judicial standard developed in 
the 1989 Fifth Circuit case Daniel R.R. v. Board of Education.113  The case involved 
Daniel R., a child with Down syndrome, who had mental and speech impairments.  
Daniel’s parents wanted him to receive his education in a regular education classroom 
and he was initially placed in such a classroom for part of his pre-Kindergarten school 
day.  However, shortly after the beginning of his school year, it became clear to the 
teacher and school administration that the regular classroom was not a viable option 
for Daniel as he required constant individual attention.  In order for Daniel to 
comprehend the curriculum, it would need to be significantly altered.  Thus, the 
school district’s special education officials determined that Daniel would be taken 
out of a regular classroom setting.114  Daniel’s parents followed the procedural 
process to try to get their son back into a regular education classroom.  However, the 
administrative hearing officers and district court all found for the school district on 
the grounds that Daniel was not receiving an educational benefit in the regular 
classroom.115 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the district court that the 
school district had met the LRE mandate for Daniel.  The court came to this 
                                                          
110  Id. at 1061.   
111  Id. at 1063. 
112  Id.  
113  See Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989); Oberti v. Bd. of Educ. of Clementon 
Sch. Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1215 (3d Cir. 1993); L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 F.3d 966, 977 (10th Cir. 2004).  
114  Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1039.  
115  Id. at 1040.  
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conclusion through the application of a multi-factor test constructed in the wake of 
Rowley.  The court first considered how the school district took steps to accommodate 
the student in a regular education environment, while recognizing that there are limits 
to what a school district is required to provide.116  The next two factors considered 
were: whether a child would receive an educational benefit in a regular education 
environment and a balancing of the benefits of both regular and special education for 
the child.  The final factor was an assessment of what effect a child with special 
educational needs would have on a regular education environment and the learning 
of regular education students.117  The court also articulated a second prong using 
language from the statute.  If a court  determines that “education in the regular 
classroom cannot be achieved satisfactorily,” the court must look at whether the child 
has been mainstreamed to the extent appropriate.118  After considering these factors, 
the court concluded that the school district took sufficient steps and made efforts to 
accommodate Daniel in the regular education environment by providing 
supplementary aides and services.  They also determined that he received “little if 
any” educational benefit in the regular education classroom and that he was making 
some progress in a special education environment.  Finally, they held that Daniel’s 
presence in a regular classroom was unfair to the rest of the class since the teacher 
was required to spend a significant amount of time attending to just one student.119  
 Thus, the Daniel R.R. test has two prongs.  The first prong considers four non-
exhaustive factors: (1) the efforts of the school district to mainstream; (2) the 
educational benefit; (3) a balancing analysis; and (4) the impact a regular classroom 
placement has on the regular education students.  The second prong, used when 
regular classroom placement is not workable, is whether the child has still been 
mainstreamed to the extent possible.  
 
C. RACHEL H. 
 
The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits also use a multi-factor test in assessing a school 
district’s application of the LRE mandate that is a slight variation on the Daniel R.R. 
test.  The test, adding a factor for cost, was first utilized in the Eleventh Circuit,120 
but is most clearly articulated in the 1994 Ninth Circuit case Sacramento Unified 
School District v. Holland ex. rel. Rachel H.121  In that case, Rachel H., a nine-year-
old student with moderate mental disabilities, had an IEP that placed her in a special 
education classroom for half the time and a regular education classroom for the other 
half.  Her parents, seeking greater mainstreaming, requested that she spend more time 
in a regular education classroom.  The school district declined by saying that Rachel 
                                                          
116  Id. at 1048 (“States need not provide every conceivable supplementary aid or service to assist the 
child”).  
117  Id. at 1049.  
118  Id. at 1050.  
119  Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1050–51. 
120  See Greer v. Rome City Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 697 (11th Cir. 1991); See also Sch. Dist. of Wis. 
Dells v. Littlegeorge, 295 F.3d 671, 672 (7th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging cost as a factor in evaluating the LRE 
mandate). 
121  Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1994).  
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H. would not benefit from being in a regular classroom fulltime.122  The 
administrative hearing officers and district court found in favor of Rachel H.  The 
district court applied the following four-factor test to conclude full mainstreaming 
was required:  
(1) the educational benefits available to Rachel in a regular classroom, 
supplemented with appropriate aids and services, as compared with the 
educational benefits of a special education classroom; (2) the non-
academic benefits of interaction with children who were not disabled; (3) 
the effect of Rachel's presence on the teacher and other children in the 
classroom; and (4) the cost of mainstreaming Rachel in a regular 
classroom.123 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit determined the four-factor test was appropriate for LRE 
cases, with its inclusion of cost as a factor.124  The court recognized its origins in 
Daniel R.R. but also followed Greer by adding the cost of mainstreaming as a 
consideration available to the courts.125  Further, the court agreed with the district 
court’s application of the test and affirmed the ruling in favor of Rachel H.  The 
district court had found that Rachel received “substantial educational benefits” from 
being in a regular education classroom, developed social skills from her placement 
with non-disabled children, and was not a distraction in the classroom.126  
Additionally, at trial, the school district failed to demonstrate evidence supporting 
the idea that mainstreaming Rachel H. was more expensive than the segregated 
setting or was otherwise overly financially burdensome for the school district.127  
Thus, the Ninth Circuit established an LRE judicial standard that follows the main 
points of the Daniel R.R. standard, but added a clear consideration of costs.  
 
V. ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT LRE JUDICIAL STANDARDS 
 
In order to determine the viability of the three current primary judicial tests as a 
national standard, they need to be analyzed under the evaluative framework 
constructed in Part III.  This framework considers first elements that are primarily 
oriented toward enabling student progress and mainstreaming, an interest of parents 
and children primarily but also the other key stakeholders and consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent.  The evaluative framework then has a secondary 
consideration of whether the LRE in the specific case is feasible both logistically and 
financially, reflecting the concerns of school districts and special education 
professionals.128  
 
                                                          
122  Id. at 1400.   
123  Id. at 1400–01.  
124  Id. at 1404.  
125  Id. (acknowledging district court’s reliance on Greer, 950 F.2d at 697 (including cost as a factor)).  
126  Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1401.  
127  Id. at 1401–02.   
128  See discussion supra Part III.E (establishing the evaluative framework).  
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A. ANALYSIS OF RONCKER STANDARD 
 
The Roncker standard offers a comparative analysis for LRE cases.  It requires 
courts to look at features of segregated learning environments and determine if they 
can be reasonably incorporated into a regular learning environment.  Under the first 
prong of the evaluative framework, which requires a focus on progress and 
mainstreaming, this standard seems ambiguous.  The Roncker standard does not 
explicitly state that the environment where advantageous features can work best will 
be the best one to provide educational progress.  This lack of clarity leaves the test 
open to the problem the Supreme Court identified regarding the Rowley FAPE 
standard.  Namely, the difference between the environments could be negligible, and 
in fact the movement of a child between such environments could pose a problem 
that impairs educational progress in such a scenario.  While these situations are 
hypothetical, they demonstrate that the Roncker test does not clearly respond to the 
first prong of analysis regarding the strong emphasis on Endrew’s progress language.  
The Roncker standard responds more favorably to the second prong of analysis 
in that it incorporates feasibility.  By inquiring as to the applicability of features of a 
segregated learning environment to a regular one, it is giving the school districts a 
certain amount of discretion.  It gives them the ability to look at their work force and 
resources and determine how to practically accommodate the needs of children with 
special educational needs.  However, it falls short in that it does not explicitly 
consider financial costs, an issue that occurs in IDEA litigation.  While this vagueness 
is not as significant as that in the first prong, it still falls short.  
Overall, the Roncker standard is not a workable national standard for LRE 
litigation.  It is too vague in key points of litigation: the need for real student progress 
and the consideration of financial costs.  Further, it has limited use and would not 
necessarily be applicable to all LRE cases.  As has been observed, it is only applicable 
if a segregated learning environment is determined to be superior.129  Additionally, 
there are cases where the LRE issue centers on services provided (aides, technology, 
etc.) rather than the physical classroom space.  Under such a standard, the key 
stakeholders will be left to struggle with the vagueness, and courts will be forced to 
compare two different educational environments, one potentially hypothetical, on a 
regular basis.  
B. ANALYSIS OF DANIEL R.R. STANDARD 
 
The Daniel R.R. standard offers a more robust test as it evaluates the action of 
the school district to achieve mainstreaming, the educational benefits provided to the 
students, a balancing of special and regular education, and the impact on the regular 
classroom environment.  Applying the Part III evaluative framework, the standard 
responds favorably to the primary progress and mainstreaming prong of analysis.   
Daniel R.R.’s test starts by examining how a given school district attempted to 
accomplish mainstreaming the student.  The second and third Daniel R.R. factors 
focus on a real educational benefit and balance the benefits and detriments of special 
and regular education options.  These factors respond favorably to the progress 
                                                          
129  Farrell & Marx, supra note 11, at 1830. 
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language of Endrew by bringing educational benefits to the forefront and allowing 
flexibility in comparing special and regular education.  
In terms of the feasibility prong, the standard fares relatively well.  The Daniel 
R.R. court’s language recognizing the limits of what school districts could provide is 
incorporated into the first factor.130  This provides protection to school districts from 
financial and labor crushing accommodations.  It also critically acknowledges the 
impact of mainstreaming on the regular education classroom.  This is an important 
feasibility consideration for school districts, both in terms of the capacity of their 
teachers and their responsibility to educate general education students.  
Overall, the Daniel R.R. standard is viable under the Part III evaluative 
framework.  The concerns of all the key stakeholders are addressed.  First and most 
importantly, its focus on mainstreaming and educational benefits addresses the 
student progress goal of IDEA that is common to the stakeholders but chief for 
children and parents.  By balancing the benefits available in different learning 
environments, they are giving school districts flexibility in figuring out different 
ways to accommodate students.  Finally, by acknowledging the impact 
mainstreaming can have on a regular classroom environment, the standard is 
addressing the concerns of special education professionals by ensuring that 
mainstreaming does not inordinately strain educators or come at the expense of their 
professional responsibility to regular education students.  
 
C. ANALYSIS OF RACHEL H. STANDARD 
 
Derived from the Daniel R.R. standard, the Rachel H. standard also fares 
favorably under the evaluative framework.  The first and second factors strongly 
reflect the first prong of the analysis.  The first factor clearly reflects the 
mainstreaming goal of the statute and Endrew’s progress language by assessing 
educational benefits and providing a comparison between educational environments.  
The second factor strengthens the connection by providing for the consideration of 
non-academic growth.  This is a recognition of the holistic aspect of the educational 
process that includes social growth and general human development—matching the 
spirit of Endrew.  
The standard also fares very well under the feasibility prong.  Like Daniel R.R., 
the Rachel H. standard considers the impact of mainstreaming on the regular 
education classroom.  This consideration provides for true feasibility, because it 
allows school districts and education professionals to consider their school 
community as a whole when determining placements.  The fourth factor of the test is 
truly what sets Rachel H. apart in terms of the feasibility prong.  By explicitly calling 
for the consideration of costs of mainstreaming, it allows school districts true 
flexibility when dealing with strained resources.  It also addresses a key policy issue 
surrounding IDEA: proper federal funding.  Thus, Rachel H. offers a comprehensive 
response to the feasibility concern.  It allows for consideration of the complexity and 
challenges of administrating a school both in terms of obligations to maintain an 
effective learning environment for all students and the significant issue of financial 
                                                          
130  Daniel R.R. v. Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1989). 
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strain.   
In sum, Rachel H. provides the most viable national LRE standard.  It already 
incorporates the subsequent Supreme Court guidance on IDEA in Endrew, as well as 
the strong language favoring mainstreaming in the statute itself, and it offers real 
discretion and deference to educators and administrators by effectively incorporating 
feasibility.  All the key stakeholders and their core concerns fare well under this 
standard.  Parents and children get a focus on real and holistic educational progress 
and benefits.  School administrators get to consider finances in an era when many 
school system budgets are strained.  The cost consideration addresses a key policy 
concern of special education professionals (funding).  Also, this group’s interests are 
addressed with the consideration of professional responsibilities to all students by 
looking at the impact on regular education classrooms.  
 
VI. LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
 
The clarification of a judicial standard is important for resolving the open legal 
question of how to apply the LRE mandate.  However, as a statute, the primary 
responsibility of clarifying and updating IDEA lies with Congress.  Indeed, for a 
significant portion of the statute’s history it did just that.  The statute was regularly 
reauthorized through 2004.  Since then, attempts to reauthorize the statute have failed.  
There have been proposals for reauthorization in Congress since then, primarily 
focused on fully funding special education programs through legislation, including 
the IDEA Full Funding Act.  Yet, the various iterations of the IDEA Full Funding 
Act131 have failed to advance in several Congresses.132  
The failure of these reauthorization attempts is best understood with the context 
of Congress’s struggle with the No Child Left Behind Act.133  The Act, which was 
signed into law in 2002 was designed to improve educational opportunities for 
disadvantaged students and required states to administer standardized tests for 
evaluating school performance.  Over time, the rigid federal standards and sanctions 
led to the law becoming very unpopular.  For example, schools for at-risk students 
with 88% graduation rates were branded “low performance” under No Child Left 
Behind’s standards.134  Yet, it took until 2015 for Congress to finally remove the 
national provisions of the law and restore much of the control over public education 
to the states.135  This fourteen-year span between the law’s enactment and its repeal, 
despite strong criticism, demonstrates Congress’s slow, if existent, pace with 
                                                          
131  IDEA Full Funding Act, H.R. 2902, 115th Cong. (2017); IDEA Full Funding Act S.130, 114th Cong. 
(2015); IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 2789, 113th Cong. (2013); IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1403, 112th Cong. 
(2011); IDEA Full Funding Act, S. 1652, 111th Cong. (2009).  
132  Andrew Ujifusa, Full Funding for Special Education, EDUC. WEEK (June 15, 2017), http://blogs.ed-
week.org/edweek/campaign-k-12/2017/06/special_education_full_funding_congress_bipartisan.html.  
133  No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425.  
134  Motoko Rich & Tamar Lewin, No Child Left Behind Law Faces its Own Reckoning, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/us/politics/schools-wait-to-see-what-becomes-of-no-
child-left-behind-law.html.  
135  Lyndsey Layton, Obama Signs New K-12 Education Law that Ends No Child Left Behind, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/obama-signs-new-k-12-education-
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 Journal of Legislation 323 
updating education laws.  
While the challenges to updating and reauthorizing IDEA in Congress are clear, 
it is still Congress’s responsibility to ensure the law is responding to the needs of the 
American people.  For the LRE mandate, Congress should take its first opportunity 
to codify the Rachel H. test and incorporate Endrew’s progress language.  By doing 
so, Congress would greatly aid the application of IDEA and realization of its goals.  
Likewise, Congress can and should clarify the FAPE standard and expand upon 
Endrew’s holding.  Additionally, addressing the funding of special education 
programs would meet the interests of key IDEA stakeholders.  Overall, Congress 
must revisit IDEA to strengthen it and bring it into accordance with the needs and 
interests of children, parents, and schools.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Approaching five decades since its passage, IDEA is a noble and multifaceted 
statute that has certainly improved the lives of children with special educational 
needs.  However, the “puzzle” construction of the provisions suggests that there is 
still significant judicial work to be done establishing clear standards for the different 
provisions.  In particular, the least restrictive environment mandate of the statute does 
not have a national standard and the federal circuits have developed different 
frameworks.  By addressing the legislative purpose of IDEA, the Supreme Court’s 
precedent on the related free appropriate public education provision of IDEA, and 
the realities faced by the stakeholders of modern special education, the test developed 
by the Ninth Circuit in Rachel H. presents a viable national standard for LRE cases 
and can help resolve IDEA litigation.  Additionally, Rachel H. provides a blueprint 
for Congress to clarify the LRE mandate once it eventually reauthorizes the statute.  
Doing so will fulfill Congress’s responsibility to keep the statute up to date and 
ensure that IDEA becomes a more positive force in American education.   
 
